The Handshake and the Gap
What the latest Xi-Putin summit reveals about a partnership that talks big but delivers little
The photographs were perfect. Two leaders in dark suits, shaking hands in the Great Hall of the People. Xi Jinping smiling. Vladimir Putin smiling back. A photo exhibition of the “everlasting friendship” between their two countries, jointly hosted by Xinhua and TASS. The state media on both sides called it a triumph.
But photographs lie, or at least they omit. The truth of the May 19–20 summit in Beijing is that Russia came asking for things it did not get. China gave warm words, signed paperwork, and kept its wallet closed on the one thing Moscow needs most. This was a summit of gestures, not of decisions.
What happened
Putin arrived in Beijing on May 19, his 25th visit to China as president. He came straight from a different script: five days earlier, Donald Trump had stood in the same hall, called his talks with Xi “very successful,” and left with few concrete trade deals. Now it was Putin’s turn.
The two leaders signed a joint statement on “further enhancing comprehensive strategic coordination and deepening good-neighborliness and friendly cooperation.” They oversaw the signing of more than 40 bilateral agreements, covering education, technology, nuclear energy, media exchanges, artificial intelligence, and transport. Putin called Xi his “old friend.” Xi said the relationship had entered a “new stage.”
What they did not sign tells the real story. There was no deal on Power of Siberia 2, the 2,600-kilometer gas pipeline that Russia has been trying to build through Mongolia for nearly two decades. There was no arms deal, no military alliance, no new trade target. The Kremlin wanted breakthroughs. It got photo opportunities.
Why it matters: the asymmetry
The “no limits partnership” that Xi and Putin declared in February 2022, days before Russian tanks crossed into Ukraine, has always had limits. They are becoming visible.
Russia needs this relationship more than China does. That is the central fact. The war in Ukraine has cut Russia off from Western markets, frozen hundreds of billions in central bank reserves, and turned the country into a sanctions pariah. China is now Russia’s main customer for oil and gas, its main supplier of industrial goods, and its main diplomatic shield at the United Nations. Without China, the Russian war economy would be under far greater strain.
China’s position is different. Beijing benefits from a Russia that is weakened and dependent — a Russia that draws American attention away from the Pacific, buys Chinese goods, and votes with China at the UN. But China does not want a Russia that drags it into war. It has refused to send weapons to Ukraine, resisted Western secondary sanctions pressure on its banks, and carefully calibrated its support to stay just short of complicity.
The asymmetry shows in the numbers. Bilateral trade hit $245 billion in 2024, more than double the 2020 figure. But in 2025 it fell for the first time in five years, dropping roughly 7 percent as Chinese exports to Russia declined nearly 10 percent. Car shipments alone fell 46 percent in the first eleven months of 2025. The trade boom is cooling, and Russia has less leverage to reverse it.
It shows in energy, too. Power of Siberia 1, the existing gas pipeline, carries about 38 billion cubic meters annually from eastern Siberian fields to China. Power of Siberia 2 would add 50 bcm from the Yamal Peninsula — gas that once went to Europe. China knows Russia has nowhere else to sell it. So Beijing is driving a hard bargain on price, refusing to sign until Moscow gives deeper discounts. Gazprom announced a “legally binding” memorandum with China in September 2025, but no construction has started. Negotiations remain stalled.
As one analyst at the Carnegie Endowment put it: “Russia’s lack of alternative buyers means China can take its time.”
The other side: Trump changes the math
The summit did not happen in a vacuum. Trump had been in Beijing five days earlier, and his visit shifted the ground beneath Putin’s feet.
The Trump-Xi summit on May 14–15 produced little in public — no major trade deal, no breakthrough on Iran, only an agreement that Xi would visit Washington in the autumn. But the fact that it happened at all was significant. After a trade war in 2025, the two largest economies were talking again. Trump called the talks “very successful.” Xi called the visit “historic and landmark.”
For Moscow, this is an unwelcome development. Russia’s strongest card in its relationship with China has always been that both countries face a common adversary in Washington. If Trump and Xi are resetting their relationship, that card loses value. Putin arrived in Beijing not from a position of strength but from one of fear — fear that a US-China rapprochement could leave Russia isolated, squeezed between a warming Washington-Beijing axis and a still-hostile Europe.
This is not an abstract concern. The Guardian reported that Xi and Putin issued a joint condemnation of “irresponsible” US foreign policy and warned of “a drift back to the law of the jungle.” That language was aimed at Washington, but it also signals that Moscow feels the need to reaffirm the partnership publicly — precisely because it is less certain privately.
The Foreign Policy analysis published after the summit put it bluntly: Russia came to Beijing with a weak hand. China holds the cards on energy prices, pipeline construction, trade volumes, and diplomatic support. Russia can ask, but it cannot demand.
Context: a history of promises
The China-Russia relationship has been called a “comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination for the new era.” This is diplomatic language that means: we are not allies, but we are friendly enough to coordinate against the West.
The modern partnership began to take shape after the 2014 annexation of Crimea, when Western sanctions pushed Russia toward Asia. It deepened after the 2022 Ukraine invasion. Xi and Putin met frequently — in Moscow, in Beijing, at summits in Samarkand and Johannesburg. The phrase “no limits” entered the lexicon in February 2022, at what turned out to be the high-water mark of trust between the two men.
Since then, the limits have become clearer. China has not recognized Russia’s annexation of Ukrainian territories. It has not provided lethal military aid. It has not joined Russia in its confrontation with the West, preferring to present itself as a neutral party calling for negotiations. The joint statement from this summit called for a “political solution” to the Ukraine crisis — the same formula Beijing has used for two years, which means nothing concrete.
The trade figures tell the story of the relationship’s trajectory. From about $110 billion in 2020 to $245 billion in 2024, the growth was dramatic. But 2025 brought a reversal. According to Reuters, Chinese customs data showed the first annual decline in five years. The MERICS China-Russia Dashboard, a respected monitoring project, confirmed that bilateral trade fell 6.9 percent year-on-year in 2025 despite record monthly levels in December.
Energy remains the backbone of the relationship. Russia is China’s second-largest oil supplier after Saudi Arabia. But even here, the asymmetry holds: China is Russia’s largest energy customer, while Russia is only China’s second-largest oil supplier. China has options. Russia does not.
Bottom line
The May 2026 summit was a success for Xi Jinping and a necessary gesture for Vladimir Putin. Xi demonstrated that he can host the leaders of both the United States and Russia in the same week, positioning China as the pivot of a multipolar world. Putin demonstrated that he is not entirely isolated — a message he needed to send to his domestic audience and to the world.
But the substance tells a different story. Russia needs China more than China needs Russia, and the gap is widening. The war in Ukraine grinds on. The trade numbers are falling. The pipeline is stalled. The Trump-Xi reset threatens Moscow’s bargaining position. The “no limits” partnership has limits, and this summit measured them.
Putin left Beijing with 40 signed agreements and a warm handshake. He did not leave with what he came for.