Iran’s foreign minister has given the most detailed account yet of the attack that killed Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, and he was in the room when it happened.
Abbas Araghchi described to Iranian journalist Javad Mogouyi how he was pulled from the rubble of a leadership compound after the joint US-Israeli air strike that opened the war on February 28.
“I grabbed Mr Hijazi’s hand, and we made our way through the beams and boards and pieces of wood, hearing the cries for help. Water was pouring from the ceiling. Everything was wrecked.”
Araghchi was reporting to Khamenei’s deputy chief of staff, Ali Asghar Hijazi, when three explosions hit within seconds. The third blast destroyed the left side of the building. Hijazi’s secretary was killed instantly. Araghchi and Hijazi survived.
“For three days we were cut off from everything, trying to find out who was alive and who had been martyred.”
The security gap
What Araghchi’s account reveals, and what he says explicitly, is that the attack was based on precise intelligence.
“What matters, in my view, is the fact that Israel had intelligence about these meetings. This may point to a security gap that probably still exists. This needs to be fixed.”
The strikes hit multiple leadership meetings simultaneously, the Ministry of Intelligence, the Strategic Council on Foreign Policy, and the Defense Council. Israel and the US knew where Khamenei would be at 9 AM on February 28, and they knew which buildings to hit.
Araghchi’s warning that the gap “probably still exists” is significant. If the security breach has not been closed, Iran’s leadership remains vulnerable to another decapitation strike.
The pre-planned response: Code 110
Iran had prepared for exactly this scenario. Araghchi revealed that the military had a contingency plan called “Code 110”, referring to the constitutional clause on the supreme leader’s powers, that included an immediate closure of the Strait of Hormuz in the event the supreme leader was targeted.
Within hours of the attack, Iran’s forces began implementing the plan. The Strait of Hormuz was effectively closed. Global oil markets went into shock.
Iran had also improved its missile capabilities after Israel’s 12-day bombing campaign the previous year. Base reactivation time, the time needed to prepare a missile for launch after a counter-strike, had been reduced from 10-15 hours to 35-40 minutes.
A diplomat who doubted diplomacy
Araghchi told the interviewer he always doubted US negotiations would work, but pursued them anyway, even if only a 10% chance of success, to ensure no one could blame Iran for not trying.
In the final round of talks in Geneva, Iran offered a deal on its nuclear program. The next day, Oman’s foreign minister called to say Washington’s mood had turned suddenly more bellicose. The strikes came days later.
The new leadership
Araghchi had not yet met Mojtaba Khamenei, the son who succeeded the dead supreme leader. He described Mojtaba’s appointment as sending “a very important message to the world that there would be no change in the regime’s policies and ideals.”
That message has been received. The war continues. The Strait of Hormuz remains contested. And Iran’s foreign minister, speaking from an undisclosed location, says he has been “on the move” ever since he crawled out of the rubble.