DHARAMSHALA, The 14th Dalai Lama turned 91 on July 6. The birthday was celebrated quietly in the Himalayan exile town of Dharamshala, where he has lived since fleeing Tibet in 1959. But the question of what comes after him is the subject of an increasingly open battle between India and China, a contest not just for political influence but for the soul of Buddhism itself.
At stake is control over the most recognizable religious figure in the Buddhist world: the next Dalai Lama.
The succession question
At his 90th birthday last year, the Dalai Lama ended years of speculation by affirming that the institution will continue after his death. His Gaden Phodrang Trust, the body that manages his affairs, holds sole authority to recognize his reincarnation, a pointed exclusion of Beijing.
He has suggested his successor will be born in the “free world,” outside Chinese control.
China rejected the plan immediately. Beijing insists that any reincarnation must comply with Chinese law and “historical conventions”, specifically the Qing-era Golden Urn ritual, codified in a 2007 State Religious Affairs Bureau order that requires state approval for all reincarnations of living Buddhas.
The precedent is grim. After the 10th Panchen Lama died in 1989, the Dalai Lama recognized a six-year-old boy named Gedhun Choekyi Nyima as his reincarnation in 1995. Within days, the child disappeared into Chinese custody. He has not been seen in three decades. China installed its own candidate, Gyaltsen Norbu, who is largely unrecognized by Tibetans.
The baseline expectation among Tibet watchers is that there will be two rival Dalai Lamas: one chosen in exile, one anointed by Beijing.
China’s Buddhist diplomacy
Beijing has invested heavily in positioning itself as the center of the Buddhist world. Its World Buddhist Forum, launched in 2006, drew roughly 800 monks and scholars from 70 countries in 2024. China has funded temples, universities, and relic loans across Asia, from Sri Lanka to Cambodia to Nepal.
The strategy serves three purposes: it softens China’s image in the Theravada Buddhist countries of Southeast Asia, where Belt and Road projects have created both dependence and unease; it builds a constituency of foreign monasteries that may accept a Beijing-appointed Dalai Lama; and it accelerates the Sinicization of Tibetan Buddhism within China’s borders.
But there is a paradox at the heart of Beijing’s effort. As Dibyesh Anand of the University of Westminster told The Diplomat: “Beijing remains trapped by its own absurd logic… an atheist party that doesn’t believe in past lives insisting it alone can authorize reincarnation.”
India’s counter
India holds the historical and geographic advantage. The Buddha attained enlightenment at Bodh Gaya, preached his first sermon at Sarnath, and died at Kushinagar, all on Indian soil. India has hosted the Dalai Lama for 67 years, giving New Delhi unmatched moral standing in the Tibetan Buddhist world.
Prime Minister Narendra Modi has played this card more openly in recent years. He sent public birthday greetings to the Dalai Lama in 2025, drawing formal Chinese protests. India has hosted Global Buddhist Summits, funded pilgrimage infrastructure, and engaged in relic diplomacy, sending sacred remains of the Buddha to Thailand, Vietnam, and Mongolia.
In January 2026, Modi inaugurated an exhibition of the Piprahwa gems, among the first discovered bodily remains of the Buddha, after India halted their auction at Sotheby’s.
But as one analyst noted: “Where China’s problem is credibility, India’s is execution.” Buddhist sites in India capture only a fraction of global Buddhist tourism, hampered by poor connectivity and visa friction. The revival of Nalanda University, meant to be the crown jewel of Indian knowledge diplomacy, has been marred by governance turmoil.
A succession without resolution
The Dalai Lama is 91 and in declining health. When he dies, the institution he leads will face its greatest test since the 1959 exile. Two claimants are all but certain. The question is which one the Buddhist world, and the world beyond, will recognize.
The answer will determine not just the future of Tibetan Buddhism, but the shape of a religious and geopolitical contest that neither India nor China can afford to lose.
Sources: The Diplomat (July 7, 2026)