The Trump administration’s nuclear cooperation agreement with Saudi Arabia is not just a bad nonproliferation deal. It is a foreign policy document that jettisons two longstanding US demands at once, and the reactions from Israel and Congress suggest the administration may have miscalculated.
The normalization requirement, abandoned
For years, the standard US position was that Saudi Arabia could have civilian nuclear technology only after normalizing relations with Israel. This was the Abraham Accords framework extended to its logical conclusion: peace for cooperation.
The new deal drops that requirement entirely.
The Trump administration argues that the strategic logic has changed. The US is at war with Iran. Keeping Saudi Arabia in the American orbit, and out of China’s, matters more than extracting normalization concessions that Riyadh was never going to deliver on a deadline. Energy Secretary Chris Wright, who is expected to formally sign the deal Wednesday, said it “upholds the highest standards of nuclear safety and nonproliferation.”
Yusuf Can, a Middle East expert at Amena Strategies, put the administration’s reasoning bluntly: “Countries in the Middle East want to develop their nuclear infrastructure and they’re going to do it even if the US is not involved. Washington at this point is recognizing that… the US is basically saying you don’t have to work with China. You can work with us.”
Israel’s alarm, and its silence
The deal landed in Israel like a warning shot.
Avigdor Lieberman, the former Israeli defense minister and current parliament member, wrote on social media that “a civilian nuclear program in Saudi Arabia will lead to a mad arms race across the entire Middle East.”
His choice of words is precise. “Mad” is not hyperbole here. Israel has long relied on its undeclared nuclear monopoly in the region as the ultimate security guarantee. A Saudi enrichment capability, even a civilian one, erodes that monopoly without Israel having any say in the matter.
NPR reported that the deal “deepened concerns that Israel, a major American ally, and Trump are increasingly diverging on foreign policy and security.” That is diplomatic language for: Israel is watching Washington cut deals with its regional rival over the objections of American allies, and wondering what the alliance is worth.
Other Israeli officials sought to downplay the agreement publicly, but the message from Jerusalem is unmistakable. The US chose a commercial and strategic partnership with Riyadh over the traditional priority of protecting Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region.
The double standard returns
The nonproliferation concerns are just as sharp from Capitol Hill, where the deal faces an uncertain reception.
Representative Ro Khanna, a California Democrat, called it “a giveaway to the Saudis” that “is only going to fuel further ambitions from Iran. It’s only going to further destabilize the region with Israel.”
Imran Bayoumi, a former US Defense Department policy adviser now at the Atlantic Council, said: “It certainly helps lay the groundwork for nuclear weapons in the future.”
The BBC report on the deal notes that the agreement does not include the strict enforcement measures that past US nuclear deals included, the “gold standard” of the 2009 UAE agreement is absent. There is no categorical ban on enrichment or reprocessing. There is no requirement for the IAEA Additional Protocol, which gives inspectors expanded access to detect undeclared nuclear activities.
The administration says a separate bilateral safeguards agreement will provide verification. But those terms are not yet public, and Congress cannot evaluate them independently until they are.
What the deal says about US priorities
The administration’s argument, keep Saudi business away from China, secure energy diversification, reward a strategic partner, has internal logic. But it also reveals what Washington is willing to trade away: the principle that arms control commitments should apply equally to allies and adversaries, and the trust of a longstanding ally in Israel.
The pact is expected to go to Congress for review in the coming days. Given the breadth of opposition, from pro-Israel lawmakers, nonproliferation hawks, and Democrats alike, the administration may have a harder time selling it in Washington than it did in Riyadh.