Published: June 04, 2026, 06:22 UTC
The CEOs of the world’s leading AI companies do not agree on much. They compete for talent, for market share, for the attention of regulators. But on Wednesday, a group that included Sam Altman, Dario Amodei, Demis Hassabis, and Mustafa Suleyman set their differences aside to sign a joint letter to Congress. The subject: preventing AI from being used to develop biological weapons.
The letter, organized by the nonpartisan Institute for Progress and the right-leaning Foundation for American Innovation, calls for new laws requiring companies that sell synthetic DNA and RNA to screen customers and orders for dangerous genetic sequences.
The threat
The letter acknowledges a stark assessment: “There is a real possibility that the knowledge barriers which have historically prevented bad actors from obtaining biological weapons will meaningfully erode.”
This is not hypothetical. In 2017, Canadian researchers used $100,000 worth of mail-order DNA to reconstitute the extinct horsepox virus, a close relative of smallpox. The experiment was conducted openly, but critics quickly noted that the same methodology could be used to construct smallpox itself. Gene synthesis has only gotten cheaper and more accessible since then.
Combined with advances in AI, the concern has deepened. Large language models can now help users identify where to order synthetic sequences that will not be screened. They can advise on how to modify an order so that even screening systems may not detect it. While significant biology expertise would still be required to construct a functional pathogen from scratch, the knowledge barrier is lower than it has ever been, and it is dropping.
“AI tools enable a user to very quickly identify where to turn to order sequences that will not be subject to screening,” said David Relman, a microbiologist and biosecurity expert at Stanford who signed the letter. “If prompted appropriately, they can also tell you how to change the nature of your order, so that even those that are screening may be much less able to detect what it is you are trying to make.”
The ask
The signatories include not just AI executives but also scientists, national security experts, and leaders from gene synthesis companies like Twist Bioscience and Ansa Biotechnologies. Many of these companies are already members of the International Gene Synthesis Consortium, which formed in 2009 to implement voluntary screening practices. The letter argues that voluntary measures are no longer sufficient.
“If you have technology that is capable of synthesizing DNA, then you should ensure that it is used responsibly,” said James Diggans, vice president of policy and biosecurity at Twist Bioscience. “Part of that is making sure that you understand what you are making and who you are making it for.”
Federal guidelines introduced during the Biden administration already require scientists and companies that receive federal funding to order synthetic gene sequences from providers that screen purchases. A bipartisan bill introduced earlier this year in the Senate would go further, requiring all gene synthesis providers operating in the United States to screen orders and customers for bad actors or dangerous pathogens.
Gaps in the system
But screening is not foolproof. Last year, Microsoft researchers published a study showing that AI protein design tools could generate potentially dangerous gene sequences that slipped past commercial screening software. The models proposed new protein sequences with structural similarities to known dangerous ones.
Geoff Ralston, former president of Y Combinator and a partner at the Safe AI Fund, thinks AI labs themselves need to take responsibility. “It should be very difficult, if not impossible, to ask a model to help you do something imminently dangerous,” said Ralston, who also signed the letter.
Relman agrees that regulation of screening procedures is only part of the solution. “Given that the screening may fail in some cases, we must then have other points of control,” he said. “That is where the AI companies are going to have to step up.”
Why it matters
The letter is notable less for its policy specifics than for the unanimity it represents. Frontier AI labs have spent the past two years locked in a race for capability and talent. On the question of biosecurity, they appear to agree that the window for preventive action is narrowing. The question is whether Congress will act before the screening failures that researchers are already documenting become something worse.
_Sources: [Wired](https://www.wired.com/story/openai-anthropic-letter-ai-biological-weapons/) (June 3, 2026); [DNYUZ syndicated version](https://dnyuz.com/2026/06/04/openai-and-anthropic-sign-letter-to-prevent-ai-developed-biological-weapons/) (June 4, 2026)_