Nearly six months into the war, the United States has bombed 13,000 Iranian targets, spent $37.5 billion, and asked Congress for another $67 billion. And Iran, by most measures, has the upper hand.
That is the argument Howard W. French makes in Foreign Policy this week, laying out how a conflict that began with a US-Israeli campaign of near-impunity strikes has become an open-ended war of attrition that Iran is well-positioned to win by not losing.
The early phase was lopsided. In the initial days, US and Israeli forces bombed Iranian nuclear sites, assassinated military leaders and scientists, and suffered minimal casualties. Iran appeared to be what many had assumed: a paper tiger.
The picture now is different.
Iran’s strategic advantage rests on geography that cannot be bombed away. It is a large country sitting astride the Strait of Hormuz, through which a significant share of the world’s oil passes. Closing or threatening that chokepoint costs Iran relatively little. Reopening it costs the United States enormous sums in munitions, diplomatic capital, and military risk.
“The dense patchwork of US military relationships in the Arab world has backfired,” French writes. American bases throughout the Middle East are now within range of Iranian ballistic missiles and drones, creating a vulnerability the US never faced in Iraq or Afghanistan.
The attrition is measurable. US interceptor missile stockpiles are “worrisomely low,” according to CSIS analysis. Radar systems in the region have been damaged, reducing their effectiveness against the cheap drones Iran launches in volume. The Pentagon has already spent $37.5 billion on the war and is seeking a $67 billion supplemental appropriation on top of an unprecedented $1.5 trillion budget request. Senator Susan Collins has warned the Pentagon faces “near-term solvency challenges.”
Four US service members have been killed in Iranian strikes on bases in the region. Scores have been wounded.
The Houthis, emboldened by Iran’s success, have vowed to halt maritime traffic in the Red Sea, a secondary chokepoint through which 7 percent of global oil flows via the Bab el-Mandeb strait. French warns against treating the Houthi threat as a bluff, given Iran’s proof of concept at Hormuz.
Trump’s response has been to escalate the threats. He has renewed warnings about attacking Iranian civilian infrastructure, bridges, dams, power stations, which would risk violating international laws of war and would be unlikely to break Iranian will.
The core problem, French argues, is that Iran’s goal is simply not surrendering, rather than winning conventionally. As long as that remains the aim, forcing compliance is nearly impossible.
French’s proposed solution is one most Washington foreign-policy professionals do not want to hear: recognize the legitimacy of Iran’s Islamist government and offer it “strong security guarantees” against future US or Israeli attack.
The Pentagon, for its part, appears to be preparing for a longer war rather than an exit. The $67 billion supplemental request suggests the administration sees this as a multi-year commitment. And the number of targets remaining to strike, after 13,000 have already been hit, raises the obvious question of what the next 13,000 will accomplish that the first 13,000 did not.