The United States has renamed its Indo-Pacific Command back to Pacific Command, reversing a 2018 decision that signaled strategic focus on the region. The change is not merely bureaucratic. It reflects a deeper shift: the second Trump administration is less interested in the “Indo-Pacific” construct than its predecessor was, and America’s Asian allies are starting to plan for a future in which they cannot count on Washington.
The honest answer to whether they can deter China without the US is a qualified no. What Japan, South Korea, India, Australia and Indonesia can do together is deter by denial at sea — making it prohibitively costly for China to attempt a naval move. What they cannot do, minus the United States, is deter a major war.
The geographic cards are not bad. These five countries sit astride the first island chain and the Malacca, Sunda and Lombok straits — China’s key energy sea lanes. Japan’s defense budget is reaching 2 percent of GDP, and it is fielding counterstrike missiles. South Korea plans to lift defense spending from 2.3 to 3.5 percent of GDP by 2035 and has one of the world’s most productive defense industries. India keeps a large share of Chinese forces pinned on the Himalayan frontier and exports BrahMos missiles to Indonesia.
The gaps are equally clear. There is no mutual defense obligation among the five. No unified command. No shared war plan. No substitute for the US extended nuclear deterrence that protects Tokyo and Seoul. South Korea’s forces remain fixed on Pyongyang, not Beijing. Indonesia refuses to name China as a threat and continues to strengthen trade with it.
The diplomatic calendar is busy. Indian Prime Minister Modi is wrapping up a tour of Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand. South Korean President Lee Jae-myung has visited India, Vietnam and Mongolia. Japanese PM Takaichi Sanae toured Vietnam, Australia, South Korea and India between May and July. These packed schedules show that regional powers are looking for alternatives.
One analysis identifies four areas where cooperation is possible without Washington. Maritime domain awareness — a shared operating picture across two oceans — is relatively cheap and non-controversial. Logistics and access agreements are already expanding: Australia and Japan have a Reciprocal Access Agreement. Defense-industrial co-production is underway — South Korean K9 howitzers are built in India as the Vajra, and Australia’s first Japanese-built Mogami frigate is expected in 2029. Collective resilience against economic coercion — independence in critical mineral supply chains — may be the most urgent front, given Beijing’s willingness to use trade as a weapon.
But institutional frameworks remain uneven. India runs 2+2 dialogues with Tokyo and Canberra but not with Seoul or Jakarta. Japan-South Korea intelligence-sharing is politically fragile. Threat perceptions vary: Tokyo sees an existential maritime challenge; New Delhi sees a continental one; Seoul prioritizes the North; Jakarta avoids naming a threat at all.
The web of bilateral and minilateral arrangements, not any single alliance, may develop into a deterrent over time. But that is a long-term project. For the moment, the honest answer remains the qualified one: regional powers can make aggression costly at sea, but they cannot replace the United States. And the US is signaling that it may not be there to replace.