The European Union is telling two different stories about China, and it is not clear it can keep telling both at the same time.
On June 29, the EU and China agreed on a new economic definition of their relationship: “stable and balanced key trading partners.” They launched a Trade and Investment Consultation Mechanism covering trade balancing, export controls, intellectual property, and WTO reform. Chinese Commerce Minister Wang Wentao visited Brussels. Dutch Trade Minister Sjoerd Sjoerdsma went to Beijing. The language was warm, practical, businesslike.
Ten days later, on July 8, EU member states’ ambassadors endorsed a new strategic document that describes China as a “critical long-term strategic challenge”, an upgrade from the 2019 definition that called China a “partner for cooperation, economic competitor, and systemic rival.” The new language links China directly to European security, calling it a “crucial enabler for Moscow” in the Ukraine war and placing it in the context of “systemic competition over global order, technology and influence.”
One part of the EU machinery, the Directorate-General for Trade and Economic Security, is trying to stabilize economic relations, reduce the trade deficit, and keep cooperation channels open. Another part, the Foreign Affairs Council, is hardening a threat narrative that treats China as a fundamental challenge to European security.
Both narratives contain elements of truth. China is Europe’s largest trading partner in many categories, and decoupling would be cripplingly expensive. China also supplies components that end up in Russian weapons, builds dual-use infrastructure in the Pacific, and is developing AI and surveillance technologies that European governments are increasingly wary of.
The question is whether the two approaches can coexist. China’s strategy is to make interdependence feel like a source of stability, the harder it is to separate, the harder it is to confront. The EU’s security narrative increasingly treats interdependence as a source of vulnerability.
The contradiction is playing out in real time. Even as Brussels sanctioned more China-based companies in the 20th round of Russia sanctions in April, Ukraine was reportedly allowed to use part of a 6 billion euro EU defense loan to buy Chinese-made drone components. Europe uses Chinese parts while accusing China of enabling Russia.
The fall deadline for “tangible progress” on trade is approaching. So is the next round of the Trade and Investment Consultation Mechanism in Beijing. The EU will try to keep both stories going. The question is which one China chooses to believe.