Beijing’s propaganda machine sells the invasion of Taiwan as inevitable. The military math says otherwise.
In a detailed analysis published Wednesday by War on the Rocks, Jay McVann, a U.S. Navy officer and former TOPGUN instructor, makes a cold argument: a Chinese amphibious assault on Taiwan would require China to accomplish three distinct military operations that no modern armed force has ever pulled off against prepared defenses. The threshold is not defeat. It is survival. And the numbers are not on China’s side.
The First Never, An Amphibious Landing Against Coastal Cruise Missiles
No amphibious landing in history has been attempted against a coastal defense system armed with modern cruise missiles. On D-Day, the Allies faced coastal artillery with a maximum effective range of about 15 miles. Taiwan fields the Hsiung Feng II, with a range of 75 to 93 miles, and the Hsiung Feng III, which reaches 250 miles. These are mobile, hard to locate, and designed to engage naval targets at sea before they reach the beach.
China’s amphibious plan relies heavily on civilian roll-on/roll-off ferries to carry troops and equipment across the strait. These vessels are not built for combat. They have large open vehicle decks, few firebreaks, and are loaded with fuel and ammunition. In April 2021, a fire aboard the Chinese ro-ro vessel Zhong Hua Fu Qiang demonstrated exactly how fragile these ships are. One well-placed missile on one hull eliminates the personnel and equipment of nearly two battalions. Attrition is not linear. It compounds.
Taiwan’s layered defenses include mobile coastal cruise missile batteries, naval mines, anti-ship missiles launched from aircraft and warships, and a growing inventory of attack drones. For a landing force to survive the approach, it must suppress or destroy all of them first. That is the first thing nobody has done.
The Second Never, A Large-Scale Airborne Drop Against Modern Air Defenses
The People’s Liberation Army doctrine calls for a “three-dimensional landing” that puts airborne troops behind Taiwanese defenses as a necessity, not an option. China does not have enough amphibious lift to land heavy forces by sea alone. Paratroopers are the bridge.
D-Day paratroopers jumped into machine-gun fire and antiaircraft artillery. Dangerous, yes. But the historian John Keegan wrote that within a few years of ground-launched and air-launched guided missiles becoming widespread, “no general anywhere would consider sending formations en masse against prepared positions.” That judgment has not been tested. An invasion of Taiwan would test it.
The threats to a mass airdrop include integrated air defense networks with early-warning radars, jet fighters, surface-to-air missile batteries, and man-portable Stinger-type missiles that track by infrared and are almost impossible to suppress preemptively. Suitable drop zones on Taiwan are scarce. The terrain is mountainous and urban. Finding a flat, open space large enough for a brigade-sized drop that is not covered by a SAM or a machine gun is a geometry problem with no good answer.
The Third Never, A Large Opposed Air Assault at Extreme Range
Helicopter-borne forces flying from the Chinese mainland or forward-deployed ships would have to cross the Taiwan Strait under fire, then insert into defended zones at the far end of their fuel range. No military has ever attempted a large opposed air assault of this scale and distance against a capable air defense.
Why Disruption Beats Destruction
Taiwan does not need to defeat the invasion force. It only needs to survive long enough to break the sequence. The three operations must happen in precise coordination. An airborne drop that arrives before the amphibious landing arrives alone. A helicopter assault that loses half its lift halfway across the strait. A ro-ro ship burning 50 miles from the beach. Any one of these creates a window that Taiwanese defenders can exploit.
The lift math is stark. The PLA Navy can put roughly 21,000 troops into the first wave, one heavy brigade, or about three brigades if pressed into using civilian ferries. Taiwan has seven active combined-arms brigades and 20 reserve infantry brigades. Military doctrine says the attacker needs a 3:1 advantage to succeed against prepared defenses. China would be sending three brigades against seven or more.
The argument is not that China cannot try. It is that the invasion scenario Beijing projects as an inevitability depends on three feats that no modern military has ever performed. The first time would be the worst possible time.