Why Central Asia is turning to Putin for nuclear power
Central Asia is running out of power. The region’s Soviet-era grid was built for a different century, and a booming population is pushing it past capacity. Blackouts and rationing have become a seasonal reality from the Kazakh steppe to the Fergana Valley. Now the region’s largest economies have settled on a solution: nuclear energy. But the supplier they are turning to is Moscow, and that choice comes with a price.
Kazakhstan signed a $16.5 billion deal with Russia’s state nuclear corporation Rosatom in June 2025 to build the country’s first nuclear power plant. Two VVER-1200 reactors will go up near the village of Ulken on the shores of Lake Balkhash, a site chosen after years of debate. Rosatom began engineering surveys this year. The plant is meant to generate 2.4 gigawatts by 2035, enough to power a city of several million.
Uzbekistan is moving even faster. Tashkent signed an $11 billion agreement with Rosatom in 2018 for a 2.4-gigawatt plant and has since formalized long-term cooperation. Two small RITM-200N reactors are scheduled for completion by 2030, followed by two large VVER-1000 units by the mid-2030s. Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev has also signed contingency agreements with China National Nuclear Corporation, hedging his bets.
The reason is straightforward. Central Asia wants to build an AI and critical minerals economy, but it cannot power one. Kazakhstan has one of the world’s largest reserves of lithium, rare earths, and uranium. Uzbekistan sits on significant mineral deposits. Both plan to process those resources domestically rather than export raw material. That processing requires huge amounts of electricity that existing grids cannot deliver.
Kazakhstan’s aging coal plants, inherited from the Soviet era, produce 70 percent of the country’s electricity. They are breaking down more often each year. Winter blackouts in the north, summer shortages in the south have become routine. The country’s population has grown by more than a fifth since independence, but its power generation capacity has barely budged.
Rosatom is not the only player in the game. China’s CNNC will lead construction of Kazakhstan’s second and third nuclear facilities, according to statements from Astana. China is also competing aggressively on cost. For Uzbekistan, CNNC has emerged as a genuine alternative to Rosatom, and Tashkent is using that competition to negotiate better terms with both.
But Russia holds structural advantages in Central Asia that China cannot replicate. The region’s power grids are still connected to Russia’s. Soviet-era engineering standards mean Rosatom’s technology is a familiar fit. Russian engineers speak the language. Many of the regulatory frameworks are inherited from the same Soviet system. As a report from the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs notes, “Central Asia has a special place in Russian nuclear energy diplomacy because of the post-Soviet heritage, meaning that Rosatom’s operations in the region are easier and smoother than elsewhere.”
The question is whether this convenience justifies the risk. Western sanctions on Russia over the war in Ukraine have not directly targeted Rosatom’s civilian nuclear exports, but the legal environment is shifting. The UK announced new sanctions against Rosatom subsidiaries in February 2026. A Russian nuclear supplier under sanctions introduces uncertainty into projects with 10-year construction timelines and 60-year operating lives.
There is also the security question. Central Asian nuclear plants will sit in a region where Russia has demonstrated it is willing to use energy infrastructure as a political lever. A plant built by Rosatom, serviced by Rosatom, and fueled by Rosatom gives Moscow a form of leverage that no contract can fully price in. Kazakhstan has tried to balance this by giving CNNC a role in its second and third plants, but the first plant, the one that sets the template, belongs to Russia.
The energy crisis in Central Asia is real and immediate. The region needs power, and it needs it fast. Nuclear plants take a decade to build, but they run for 60 years. The governments in Astana and Tashkent are betting that the short-term fix is worth the long-term entanglement. History suggests that in Central Asia, dependence on Moscow has a way of outlasting the original emergency.
- George, 1ban.news