Iran has three choices in the Strait of Hormuz. None of them leads to victory.
The BBC laid out the options in an analysis published Wednesday, drawing on interviews with Iranians and experts. The picture is grim for Tehran: every path carries risks that could undo the regime’s strategic position, and the clock is ticking on the one advantage it still holds.
Option 1: Accept US demands
The United States wants a guarantee of free passage through the Strait of Hormuz, an end to attacks on commercial shipping, a reduction of Iran’s highly enriched uranium stockpile, and intrusive nuclear inspections.
In exchange, Iran would get an end to the US naval blockade, sanctions relief, and protection from further attacks.
The problem: this would mean surrendering the most effective deterrent Iran has ever possessed. For decades, Tehran relied on missiles, proxies, and the nuclear program to deter attack. Closing the Strait of Hormuz has proven more powerful than any of them. In months, Iran went from a country under sanctions to one that could disrupt 20% of the world’s oil supply at will.
Hard-liners would argue that US military pressure worked, and if Tehran concedes now, Washington will come back with demands on the missile program, Hezbollah, the Houthis, and every other card Iran holds. The regime’s ideological foundations rest on resistance. Capitulation, however pragmatic, is politically radioactive.
Option 2: Escalate
Iran could intensify attacks on US bases, commercial shipping, and Gulf Arab infrastructure, driving oil prices higher and forcing Washington to compromise.
This carries the highest military risk. Mass casualties or major damage to Gulf infrastructure could draw in neighboring countries and create a broader coalition against Iran. The Revolutionary Guards may favor this option because it preserves their influence. But the Guards are not the ones who will pay the price if the Gulf states decide they have had enough and join a US-led campaign to reopen the strait by force.
Option 3: Preserve the current instability
Keep the strait contested but not fully closed. Enough pressure to retain leverage, but not enough to trigger all-out war.
This is the closest thing to a sustainable strategy, and it may be the one Iran is actually pursuing. The logic: Iran does not need to defeat a stronger enemy. It only needs to outlast the enemy’s willingness to fight. The US has been at war since February. Public support is at 29%. The president faces an election in November. Time may be on Iran’s side.
But there are two problems.
First, the domestic cost. Rising sanctions, war damage, and inflation are increasing pressure on ordinary Iranians. BBC Persian interviewed a woman in Tehran with a doctorate and 17 years of experience whose foreign-trade company closed. She has been unemployed for four months. “No one is hiring because nobody knows what will happen.” Power cuts, water shortages, soaring prices. The protests that shook Iran before the war could return.
Second, the paradox Parliament Speaker Mohammad Bagher Ghalibaf acknowledged: “The value of Hormuz lies in increasing the volume of shipping through it rather than reducing it.” Using the strait as a weapon destroys its value as a trade route. Every month the strait remains contested, alternative routes become more viable. The US, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE are investing billions in bypass options. Iran’s leverage is a wasting asset.
The unknown factor: who decides?
The BBC analysis notes that Iran’s decision-making is unusually opaque right now. Khamenei is dead. His son Mojtaba succeeded him, but the balance of power between elected politicians, the clerical establishment, and the Revolutionary Guards is unclear.
President Masoud Pezeshkian and his diplomats favor a settlement to ease economic pressure. Hard-liners in parliament and conservative media fear any concession. The Guards depend on the missile program, regional alliances, and the Hormuz strategy for their influence, they have the most to lose from a deal.
The three options do not impose the same costs on different parts of the system. A deal that saves the economy weakens the Guards. Escalation that strengthens the Guards impoverishes the population. And doing nothing slowly drains Iran’s only remaining lever of power.
The BBC’s conclusion: cycles of attacks, mediation, and temporary cease-fires could continue for months. The decisive question is how long Iran can preserve Hormuz as leverage without provoking all-out war, renewed domestic unrest, or the construction of alternative export routes that make the strait irrelevant.
None of the choices facing Iran’s leaders offers a clear path to victory. The question is which path leads to the least damaging defeat.