For nearly two decades, the guiding assumption of Indian foreign policy was that the United States would help India rise to become a major power. That assumption is now in question.
A debate is unfolding in New Delhi’s strategic community, captured in a recent analysis by Muqtedar Khan in The Diplomat, over whether India’s fraying relationship with Washington is a temporary strain or a fundamental rupture. The stakes are high. India built its post-2005 strategic posture around the US partnership: the civil nuclear deal, joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and the Quad framework all presumed a reliable American partner.
The events of 2026 have shaken that presumption.
What Went Wrong
The first signal came before Trump’s inauguration: Xi Jinping received an unusually early invitation to the ceremony. Modi received nothing comparable. Then came Operation Sindoor in May, when Washington leaned toward Islamabad, and senior US officials used language toward India that one analyst described as “insulting and disrespectful.”
The US imposed punitive tariffs on India for trading with Russia, tariffs that were not applied to China, Turkey, or European countries doing the same. Trump’s expected visit to India slipped off the schedule. And the talk in Washington shifted from the Quad and the Indo-Pacific to a potential US-China G2 understanding.
“The sense of betrayal and anger is palpable,” Khan writes after spending two weeks at the India International Centre in Delhi, the hub of India’s intelligentsia.
Two Visions for India’s Path
The debate in Delhi has crystallized around two poles.
Happymon Jacob, writing in India’s World, argues for “de-Americanizing” India’s grand strategy. He says India must stop “borrowing Washington’s eyes” to interpret the global order. His critique targets two “comfortable illusions”: the expectation that America will actively facilitate India’s rise, and the over-reliance on the Indian diaspora, which despite its economic success lacks the political leverage to shape US policy.
“Focus on enhancing your own capabilities,” Jacob argues. “Chart a path without dependence on the US.”
C. Raja Mohan, writing in Foreign Policy, takes the opposite view. He criticizes what he sees as entitled attitudes among Indian elites regarding easy access to US jobs and technology. The current frictions, he argues, are signs of deeper engagement, not divergence. The strategic goal remains shared: keeping the Indo-Pacific free of hegemony. “Calm down, stay the course, ride out the storm,” is his advice.
India Is Already Adjusting
While the intellectuals debate, the government is quietly repositioning.
India has leaned closer to a nexus with Israel and the UAE in West Asia, moving away from its traditional non-alignment posture. It has reached out to China to improve ties. It is revitalizing the Russia-India-China mechanism. And under its MAHASAGAR rubric, it is deepening ties with Japan, Indonesia, and Australia, notably without the US at the center.
“The change is neither dramatic nor profound enough to be labeled a shift in grand strategy,” Khan writes, “but nor is it simply a preservation of continuity.”
The official response from New Delhi has been cautious, “batting defensively,” as one analyst put it, accommodating Trump’s unpredictability without adopting an adversarial posture. But the wider strategic community is angry, and the media and opposition are criticizing both Trump’s “perfidy” and Modi’s silence.
The question that Delhi cannot yet answer is whether the US-India relationship is going through a rough patch or a fundamental transformation. The answer depends less on Delhi than on Washington, and on whether Trump’s America wants a partner in India or simply a client.